French History Advance Access originally published online on October 16, 2008
French History 2008 22(4):469-492; doi:10.1093/fh/crn042
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‘How many Frenchmen did you kill?’ British bombing policy towards France (1940–1945)
* Lindsey Dodd is a doctoral candidate at the University of Reading, working on the AHRC-funded project Bombing, States and Peoples in Western Europe, 1940–45, and may be contacted at l.a.dodd{at}reading.ac.uk; Andrew Knapp is Professor of French Politics and Contemporary History at the University of Reading. His publications include Le gaullisme après de Gaulle (Seuil, 1996) and The Uncertain Foundation: France at the Liberation, 1944–47 (Palgrave, 2007). He is currently a co-investigator on the AHRC-funded project Bombing, States and Peoples in Western Europe, 1940–45. He may be contacted at a.f.knapp{at}reading.ac.uk
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Abstract |
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The Allied bombing of France between 1940 and 1945 has received comparatively little attention from historians, although the civilian death toll, at about 60,000, was comparable to that of German raids on the UK. This article considers how Allied, and particularly British, bombing policy towards France was developed, what its objectives were and how French concerns about attacks on their territory were (or were not) addressed. It argues that while British policymakers were sensitive to the delicate political implications of attacking France, perceived military necessities tended to trump political misgivings; that Vichy, before November 1942, was a stronger constraint on Allied bombing than the Free French at any time and that the bombing programme largely escaped political control from May 1944.